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Manners, Morals and Legal Education
by Thomas Ehrlich

Many spokesmen for the legal
profession have been calling on
the law schools to pay more attention
to ethical responsibilities,
usually meaning manners and
civility. But many of today's law
students believe that the profession
is not meeting some of its public
responsibilities. When that problem
is squarely faced, with the law
schools' help, then good manners
should follow.

INtheTHE
few years
of
haveleaders
appealed
legalPAST
profession
for law students-and law schools-to
pay more attention to legal ethics.
Their pleas usually have been public,
occasionally strident. Over the same
period many law students have urged
more attention by the legal profession
to ethical responsibilities. Their voices
were less public but often more strident.
These appeals from two quite different quarters may sound similar. That
similarity is only on the surface, however, and it hides a disturbing gap between many who are in law practice
and many of their successors, now law
students. It is difficult to discuss questions of ethics without taking on the
role of preacher. While seeking to
avoid that role, I shall try to describe
these current though dissimilar concerns about legal ethics, to explain why
the gap between the two groups is disturbing and to suggest an approach
toward bridging it.
Law Schools
Have Been Delinquent
Chief Justice Burger has been
among the most forceful and eloquent
in urging law schools to pay more attention to matters of professional responsibility. He has suggested-and
others have reiterated with less tactthat law schools have been delinquent
in failing to provide adequate grounding in legal ethics for their students.
Most law schools do offer several
courses in professional responsibility.
Most could and should do more in that
field. But these offerings, like others in
law school, generally focus on troublesome, borderline issues. Tough cases
may make bad law, but they make
good lawyers, or so most law teachers
think. These courses, in the main, deal

with close questions in the areas covered by the Code of Professional Responsibility. They consider, for example, the clusters of problems concerning a lawyer's conflict of interests and
representation of a "guilty" criminal
client. Some attention is usually given
to the tensions between a lawyer's duties to his client and his duties to the
court. Difficult questions are raised, for
example, by the contempt citations of
the defense lawyers in the so-called
Chicago Seven case. But the borderline
aspects of the case involved not the
lawyers' conduct but rather what the
legal system should do in response and
how to go about doing it. The overwhelming majority of the Bar would
agree that it is improper for a lawyer
to say some of the things to a judge
that were said by defense attorneys in
the case. Sharp disagreements arise,
however, about the propriety of alternative sanctions and particularly about
the process of deciding on those sanctions. Law school offerings on professional responsibility concentrate on
these and similar issues.
Although I support the call for more
courses in professional responsibility, I
doubt that those courses will solve the
concerns of leaders of the profession
who are doing the calling. As I understand them, the bad manners of some
lawyers is of primary concern. They
point particularly to the courtroom antics of a small but noisy group of attorneys and propose that law schools
should meet the problem in the classroom through inculcation. Law teachers, the Chief Justice has said, "have
the first and best chance to inculcate in
young students of the law the realization that in a very hard sense the hackneyed phrase 'order in the court' articulates something very basic to the
mechanisms of justice. Someone must

November, 1972 * Volume 58

1175

Manners, Morals and Legal Education

Stanford Publications

A graduate of Harvard College and
Harvard Law School, Thomas Ehrlich
is Dean of the Stanford Law School.
Before he joined the Stanford faculty
in 1965, he served as a law clerk to
Judge Learned Hand, practiced law
in Milwaukee and held positions in
the State Department. He was appointed Stanford dean in 1971.
teach that oood manners, disciplined
behavior and civility -by whatever
name -are the lubricants that prevent
lawsuits from turning into combat."
Responsible Lawyers Should
Be Shocked by Lack of Respect
In my view, responsible lawyers
should be shocked by the lack of respect accorded judges and their courtrooms by some attorneys. The behavior of those attorneys is often contemptible-literally and legally. But I
doubt that it will he materially diminished, let alone eliminated, by increased attention to legal elhics in law
schools.
The basic point is a distinction between good manners and legal ethics.
Stripped to the core, much of what
Chief Justice Burger and others have
been calling for in public addresses on
legal ethics comes down to matters of
manners. These are not small matters.
No legal system such as ours can survive very long unless most of its participants behave with good manners. Not
only is it more pleasant, but it is far
more utilitarian if most people act and
react with courtesy and respect for
most other people. This is particularly
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important for our legal system because
the institutions of that system depend
in major measure for their effectiveness upon the degree of respect with
which they are treated.
Without in any way demeaning or
diminishing the importance of a lawyer's manners, I suggest that there is
relatively little that a law school can do
to instill those manners in students
who do not already have them when
they are admitted to the school. If family., church and prelaw schooling have
not imbued the moral values that are
the foundation for good manners, then
it is unlikely that a law school can
change the situation. In fact, most
cases of concern to the Chief Justice
and others involve, I suspect, not so
much a lack of knowledge of good
manners as a deliberate unwillingness
to use them.
Law schools can and should,
through their educational programs,
encourage respect for legal institutions,
and continued respect is a prerequisite
for good manners. But law schools can
only educate--they cannot inculeate.
They can inform students about the institutions of the legal system, but it
will ultimately be the behavior of those
institutions that determines whether
they are accorded continuing respect
by future lawyers. Most important
among the institutions, for this purpose, is the legal profession itself.
What can be done by the legal
profession to promote that necessary,
although not sufficient, respect among
law students and young lawyers? I am
disturbed by how many law students
picture the legal profession as not sire.
ply amnoral but positively immoral. In
the past the public's opinion of the
profession often has not been an at.
tractive one. Since colonial times there
never has been unqualified public respect for the legal profession. But it has
rarely been viewed with as much disdain by as many who are about to become its members. Why is this so? It
seems paradoxical that at the very time
that more young men and women are
seeking admission to law school, more
law students also view the legal profession with troubled concern, if not outright scorn.

American Bar Association Journal

A Change Has Occurred
Among Law Students
The paradox can be explained in
part by examining the reasons for the
increasing number of applications to
law schools in recent years. As in the
past most students come as an act of
faith in their own creative abilities
rather than with any certain sense of
what it means to be a lawyer. But two
phenomena are relatively new. First,
many more law students than ever before view law school as their second
choice. They would have gone to engineering schools or to Ph.D. programs
in some other field but for the perceived economic reality that those alternatives offer little promise of future
employment. In the view of some of
these students, but for the malfunctioning of the "system" they would be in
some more attractive institutional
training ground. Second, and much
more significant, a host of forces
makes many law students today more
concerned than in prior years with
their own responsibilities for helping
others. Many law students today have
absolutist notions of justice and injustice. Some urge simplistic solutions to
social issues. But a change has occurred among law students generally in
the last half decade. Many more today
than five years ago believe that they
have substantial obligations to others
less fortunate than themselves, and
they choose law as a vehicle to meet
those obligations.
A heightened, if not new, concern
with questions of social responsibility
leads directly for many students to issues of professional responsibility and
particularly of an individual lawyer's
responsibility as a professional. These
students recognize that many public offices have been established to provide
legal counsel for the poor. Most students probably would agree that in the
long run these subsidized arrangements
should be the primary vehicles for delivering legal services to those who
cannot meet the market price for private counsel. But these students also
ask whether the individual lawyer
should not have some duty to provide
his advice to those who cannot pay.
Large numbers of law students with
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whom I have talked in recent years are
troubled by what they perceive to be
the profession's failure to answer this
question. They find in Canon 2 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
that the profession itself has a "duty to
make legal counsel available". But
what, the student asks, does this duty
mean for the individual practitioner?
The code recognizes that "The basic
responsibility for providing legal services for those unable to pay ultimately
rests upon the individual lawyer
(Ethical Consideration 2-25).
But there is no disciplinary rule to
sanction a lawyer who refusesto per.
form the public service of representing
an indigent client.
An Institutional Failing
in Organized Bar?
In the view of many law students,
the failure to come to grips with these
problems is indicative of an institutional failing in the organized Bar. The
public profession of law, they urge,
should establish an explicit duty of
public service to be met by each lawyer, and the profession should then reg.
ulate itself to assure that the duty is
carried out.
A few years ago many large firms
found that unless they were willing to
ofler opportunities for pro bono pub.

lico work, the best law school gradu.
ates would turn elsewhere. Many law
students are.now concerned that a depressed market for new lawyers may
eliminate or at least dampen this interest on the part of major firms. It seems
incongruous that as the number of new
lawyers has increased sharply, thus
making possible the provision of legal
services to many more people than
ever before, these services may actually
be diminished because law firms are
under less competitive pressure to provide them.
Some suggest that most students will
lose interest in public service, particularly indigent defense work, after they
are in practice for a time. There is
some evidence to support this prediction, although it is too early to tell how
much staying power the phenomenon
really has. But my point is that the
organized Bar should not allow current
student interest in public service to become just a passing fad. Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision in Argersinger
v. Hanlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972), may
require some action, apart from other
considerations. In all events, law students are demanding more of the orgarized Bar than plaudits for lawyers
who provide public service. They want
some system of enforceable obligations.

In short, law students of today are
looking to the organized Bar to establish standards for a lawyer's duty to
provide public service. F. Raymond
Marks in a new book, The Lawyer,
The Public, and Professional Responsibility, published by the American
Bar Foundation, suggests a number of
ways in which such a duty might be
both expressed and policed. He analogizes law practice to a monopolistic
public utility and urges that the public service duties of its members be regulated under established standards of
the public interest. One need not agree
with any of the provocative approaches
proposed by Mr. Marks to concur in
his view that the time is overdue for
the profession to grapple with the
problem. Law schools, both teachers
and students, can and should take part
in this process.
To the extent that we are successful
as a profession in coming to grips with
this issue, if not necessarily resolving
it for all time. I am convinced that the
respect of law students for the Bar will
increase. With respect for the legal
profession and for the institutions
through which it serves the public will
come an increase in the manifestations
of respect. Good manners is one of
those manifestations.

Judicial Education Calendar
National College of the State Judiciary
November 3-4, 1972, Baltimore Sentencing Institute, Baltimore, Maryland

Jan. 29-February 2, -1973, Appellate Judges Seminar, Baton
Rouge, Louisiana

November 16-18, 1972, Special Court Judges Seminar, Baton
Rouge, Louisiana

January, 1973 (dates to be announced), Graduate Resident
Course, "New Developments in Criminal Law", University of
Nevada, Reno, Nevada

November 24-26, 1972, Special Court Judges Seminar, Atlanta,
Georgia
December 8-9, 1972, Indiana Sentencing Institute, (Location
not determined)
December 11-15, 1972, Appellate Judges Seminar, San Diego,
California

January, 1973, (dates to be announced), Resident Course,
"Court Administration", University of Nevada, Reno, Nevada
(For further information on these programs, write National
College of the State Judiciary, University of Nevada, Reno,
Nevada 89507.)
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